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Abstract 
 
The paper analyzes the E-3’s/EU’s diplomatic strategy vis-à-vis Iran and its nuclear 
programme against the theoretical background of coercive diplomacy. It 
investigates to what extent the E-3/EU strategy has met the theoretical criteria for 
coercive diplomacy to succeed. The paper addresses in particular the question why 
this strategy has so far, despite the “gradual turning of screw“1, not succeeded in 
dissuading Iran from pursuing fuel cycle activities. I argue that the E-3/EU coercive 
diplomacy approach vis-à-vis Iran has suffered from certain flaws: the objectivity and 
the legitimacy of the E-3/EU underlying objective and its specific demand have 
been seriously challenged not only by Iran and countries of the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) and the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), but also by the fact that 
with France and the UK the E-3/EU embraces two Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), 
which has further fuelled the perception of unfairness. Finally, I argue that a “carrots 
and sticks” policy as pursued by the E-3/EU is unlikely to work out in the Iranian case, 
taking into account that the E-3/EU demand touches on Iran’s vital interests and on 
questions of prestige, regional supremacy and nationalism. 
 
                                                 
1 A. George, “Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War”, 
Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997, p. 68.  
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Introduction: the E-3/EU and Coercive Diplomacy 
 
“[I]t is an important day for Europe because we are dealing with a major issue”, 
announced the French Minister of Foreign Affairs De Villepin when the E-3 – the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of France, Germany and the UK – in October 2003 entered 
into negotiations with Iran on its nuclear programme.2 The E-3 engagement was 
preceded by the disclosure of two undeclared uranium enrichment and heavy 
water facilities in August 2002 which called the attention of the IAEA to Iran’s possible 
nuclear ambitions and raised suspicion that Iran might strive for a nuclear weapons 
programme.3 
 
The window of opportunity for the E-3/EU to demonstrate its aspirations to become a 
serious non-proliferation and global actor has been opened by the United States 
who initially refused to attend to the Iranian nuclear issue and therefore asked the 
Europeans to step in.4 Solving the Iranian nuclear issue has - after the European 
debacle over the Iraq war - become a serious test case for Europe’s unity and for the 
European Security Strategy and the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction (WMD), both adopted in 2003.5  
 
Since then, the E-3, initially single-handedly, later joined by the EU’s High 
Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, and finally by the US, China and Russia in 
the so-called P5+2 format, have tried to prevent Iran from acquiring a closed nuclear 
fuel cycle.6 The E-3/EU have thereby embarked upon a diplomatic strategy called 
“coercive diplomacy” which couples a clear demand vis-à-vis a target with threats, 
positive inducements and a deadline for compliance.7 Despite nearly six years of 
significant E-3/EU and P5+2 engagement and five UN Security Council (UNSC) 
resolutions, so far the E-3/EU coercive diplomacy attempt vis-à-vis Iran has not 
brought about any changes in the Iranian conduct.  
 
                                                 
2 Dominique De Villepin quoted in J. Spear, “The Emergence of a European ‘Strategic 
Personality’”,  Arms Control Today, November 2003, accessed 20 May 2008, 
www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_11/Spear.  
3 O. Meier & G. Quille, “Testing Time for Europe’s Nonproliferation Strategy”, Arms Control 
Today, May 2005, accessed 13 June 2008, www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_05/Oliver_Quille.  
4 S. Harnisch, “Minilateralism, Formal Institutions and Transatlantic Cooperation: The EU-3 
Initiative vis-à-vis Iran’s Nuclear Program”, in P. Schmidt (ed.), A Hybrid Relationship: 
Transatlantic Security Cooperation beyond NATO, Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang, 2008, p. 95. 
5 E u r o p e a n  C o u n c i l ,  “ A  S e c u r e  E u r o p e  i n  a  B e t t e r  W o r l d ” ,  B r u s s e l s ,  1 2  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 3 ;  
European Council, “EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, 
Brussels, 12 December 2003; and C. Portela, “The EU and the NPT: Testing the New European 
Nonproliferation Strategy”, Disarmament  Diplomacy, No. 78, July/August 2004, 
www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd78/78cp.htm.  
6 Quille & Meier, op.cit. 
7 George, “Forceful Persuasion”, op.cit., p. 68. 
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This paper seeks to shed light on the following research questions: Why has the E-3/EU 
coercive diplomacy approach vis-à-vis Iran and its nuclear programme despite the 
“gradual turning of the screw”8 so far not succeeded in dissuading Iran from pursuing 
fuel cycle activities but instead provoked further defiance by the Iranian leadership 
and other members of the international community? Has the E-3/EU strategy met the 
necessary, theoretical criteria for coercive diplomacy success? To what extent is the 
E-3/EU coercive diplomacy approach vis-à-vis Iran a promising strategy to induce 
Iran to stop its fuel cycle activities? 
 
I argue that the E-3/EU coercive diplomacy attempt vis-à-vis Iran has had to grapple 
with certain flaws. First, against the background of the “grand bargain” of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the fact that so far nobody has been able to prove 
that Iran indeed strives for a nuclear weapon capability, the E-3/EU objective and 
specific demand is not perceived by Iran and other members of the international 
community as legitimate but rather as “excessive” and unfair.9 This has undermined 
the legitimacy and credibility of the E-3/EU demand and provoked criticism and 
defiance not only by the Iranian public but also by other members of the 
international community.10 Second, the E-3/EU coalitional format has turned out to 
be disadvantageous to address the Iranian issue as the NWS are over-represented.11 
Third, it is highly unlikely that a strategy of threats coupled with positive inducements 
is a promising approach to dissuade Iran from carrying out further fuel cycle 
activities, taking into account that this demand touches on Iran’s vital interests and 
on questions of nationalism and prestige, both psychological factors which cannot 
be influenced by altering a target’s cost-benefit calculation. 
 
The paper starts with an overview of the concept of coercive diplomacy, followed 
by the theoretical conditions for the success of coercive diplomacy. It then 
addresses the question of internal divisions among EU member states on nuclear 
disarmament. The subsequent section of the paper delineates the objectives of the 
E-3/EU in the nuclear standoff, differentiating between explicit and implicit 
objectives. In the analytical part, the theoretical framework is applied to the Iranian 
case study. The paper concludes with a brief assessment regarding the extent to 
which the E-3/EU coercive diplomacy approach vis-à-vis Iran can be regarded as a 
success. 
                                                 
8 Ibid., p. 7. 
9 T. Sauer, “Coercive Diplomacy Revisited: The Iranian Nuclear Weapons Crisis”, Chicago, 48th 
Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA), 28 February-4 March 2007, p. 
17, accessed 20  April 2008, www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/ 
1/7/8/7/0/pages178706/p178706-1.php.   
10 Ibid. 
11 S. Harnisch, “The Lessons of the EU’s Iran Diplomacy”, 2007, accessed 20 May 2008, 
www.atlantic-community.org/index/articles/view/The_Lessons_of_the_EU’s_Iran_Diplomacy.  
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Theoretical Background: the Concept of Coercive Diplomacy 
 
Broadly speaking, coercive diplomacy can be seen as a diplomatic strategy 
involving some kind of coercion seeking to bring about change in the opponent’s 
behaviour.12 It is a form of “crisis bargaining”.13 Through the use of threats, positive 
and negative incentives as well as “persuasion”, policymakers can at least try to find 
a peaceful way out of the crisis.14 This study is based on the definition of coercive 
diplomacy as used by Alexander George: “The general idea of coercive diplomacy 
i s  t o  b a c k  o n e ’ s  d e m a n d  o n  a n  a d v e r s a r y  w i t h  a  t h r e a t  o f  p u n i s h m e n t  f o r  
noncompliance that he will consider credible and potent enough to persuade him 
to comply with the demand.”15 I have deliberately chosen this definition because of 
its analytical clarity as well as its flexibility and inclusiveness of various types of threats 
which are not limited to threats of force. Coercive diplomacy is thus characterized 
by three key features: a) a demand, b) a threat of punishment and c) a deadline for 
compliance.16 The use of threats serves the purpose of convincing the opponent 
that the costs of non-compliance with the coercer’s demand will be higher than the 
costs of compliance and the expected benefits of continuing an action.17 Thus, 
coercive diplomacy aims at the cost-benefit calculation of a rational actor, trying to 
persuade him “to cease his aggression rather than bludgeon him into stopping”.18 
                                                
 
The coercive diplomacy attempt encompassing all three elements (a demand, a 
threat of punishment and a time limit for compliance) with or without positive 
inducements constitutes the purest variant of coercive diplomacy, the “classic 
ultimatum”.19 George further distinguishes between the “tacit ultimatum”, the “try-
and-see” approach and the “gradual turning of the screw” approach.20  
 
Furthermore, coercive diplomacy can vary with regard to the different kinds of 
threats which can be used by a coercer. In general, three different kinds of threats 
can be discerned: a) political and/or diplomatic threats which can be considered as 
the mildest form of coercive threats, b) economic threats which can be regarded as 
 
12 P. Bratton, “When Is Coercion Successful ?”, Naval War College Review, Vol. 58, No. 3, 2005, 
p. 101. 
13 George, “Forceful Persuasion”, op.cit., p. 68. 
14 Ibid., p. 68. 
15 Ibid., p. 4. 
16 G. Schaub, “Compellence: Resuscitating the Concept”, in L. Freedman (eds.), Strategic 
Coercion: Concepts and Cases, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 44; and Sauer, 
“Coercive Diplomacy Revisited”, op.cit., p. 3. 
17 George, “Forceful Persuasion”, op.cit., p. 11. 
18 Ibid., p. 5. 
19 George, “Forceful Persuasion”, op.cit., p. 7. 
20 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
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the strongest type of coercive threats “that can be adopted short of force”21 and c) 
threats of force which constitute the strongest and most extreme type of coercion.22 
 
Conditions for Coercive Diplomacy Success  
 
In assessing the success or failure of coercive diplomacy, this study takes into 
account the extent to which the outcome actually matches the coercer’s objectives 
as stated at the beginning of the crisis. Although this appears at least from a 
practical point of view as challenging, as the coercer’s objectives can be subject to 
change during the bargaining process23, it could shed a more nuanced light on the 
“inside/outside” dimension of the EU’s success.24 Following this argument, the paper 
will also assess the coercive diplomacy outcome according to the extent to which it 
matches the EU’s internal and external objectives of the coercion. Although the 
general success rate of coercive diplomacy is low, the strategy appears tempting to 
m a n y  p o l i c y m a k e r s  i n  o r d e r  t o  a c h i e v e  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  t a r g e t ’ s  p o l i c y  “ ‘ o n  t h e  
cheap’”, without waging war.25  
 
Demand-related Conditions: Nature of the Demand 
The nature of the demand is a key factor for the target’s motivation to comply.26 A 
high demand which touches upon the target’s vital interests will likely encounter 
strong opposition by the target, thereby making successful coercive diplomacy more 
difficult.27 George himself therefore distinguishes analytically between three kinds of 
coercive diplomacy demands: to induce the opponent, a) “to stop short of the 
goal”, b) “to undo the action” or c) “to make changes in the government”, whereby 
the third one constitutes the most ambitious type of demand.28 However, the 
decisive factors in assessing the nature of the demand are not only its magnitude but 
also the target’s “psychological perception” of it.29 Even if the demand falls within 
                                                 
21 Ibid., p. 27. 
22 P.G. Lauren, “Coercive Diplomacy and Ultimata: Theory and Practice in History”, in A.L. 
George & W.E. Simons (eds.), The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, Boulder, Westview Press, 1994, 
p. 29.   
23 A. Hyde-Price, “Coercion in Crisis Management and Peace Support Operations”, 49th 
Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA), San Francisco, 26-29 March 
2008, p. 27. 
24 K.E. Jørgensen, “The European Union’s Performance in World Politics: How Should We 
Measure Success?”, in J. Zielonka (ed.), Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy, The Hague, 
Kluwer Law International, 1998, 90. 
25 R . J.  A r t,  “ In tr o d uc ti o n ” ,  i n  R . J.  A r t &  P . M.  C r o n i n  ( ed s. ) ,  The United States and Coercive 
Diplomacy, Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003, p. 7. 
26 George, “Forceful Persuasion”, op.cit., p. 12. 
27 Ibid. 
28 A. George, “Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics”, in A.L. George & W.E. 
Simons (eds.), The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, Boulder, Westview Press, 1994, p. 9. 
29 George, “Forceful Persuasion”, op.cit., p. 12. 
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the most modest category (“stop short”), the specific requirement can be “a tough 
one to achieve”.30  
 
Legitimacy of the Demand 
The legitimacy of a demand is another important feature which can contribute to 
the success of coercive diplomacy. Even if a coercer’s objective follows norms of 
international law, it will only be perceived as legitimate if other states which allegedly 
violate norms of international law, too, are required to comply.31 Otherwise, “critics 
can easily point to the double standards” used by the coercer.32 Furthermore, with 
an underlying legitimate objective, it is easier for the coercer to obtain broad public 
support at the domestic as well as at the international level.33  
 
Assurance against More Demands in the Future 
Another important criterion which enhances the chance for success of coercive 
diplomacy is the assurance for the target against “new demands” by the coercer in 
the future.34 The target will less likely comply with the coercer’s demands if he 
expects that his compliance with the first demand could tempt the coercer to make 
further demands on him.35  
 
Threat-related Variables: Credibility of Threats 
The credibility of the coercer’s threat can indeed be regarded as key to the success 
of coercive diplomacy.36 The coercer therefore has “to leave as little room as 
possible for judgment or discretion in carrying out the threat”.37  
 
The credibility of threats depends on the following factors.38   
 
Proportionality of the Threat to the Demand 
The proportionality of the threat to the demand can have a significant impact on 
the credibility of a coercive threat. On the hand, the threat has to be “potent” 
                                                 
30 R.J. Art, “Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?”, in R.J. Art & P.M. Cronin (eds.), The 
United States and Coercive Diplomacy, Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace 
Press, 2003, p. 396. 
31 Sauer, “Coercive Diplomacy Revisited”, op.cit., p. 4. 
32 Ibid. 
33 George, “Forceful Persuasion”, op.cit., p. 68. 
34 P.V. Jakobsen, “Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War: A Challenge for 
Theory and Practice”, London, Macmillan, 1998, p. 29. 
35 Ibid., p. 26. 
36 Sauer, “Coercive Diplomacy Revisited”, op.cit., p. 5; and Bratton, op.cit., p. 101. 
37 T. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1960, pp. 40 
and 160. 
38 George, “Forceful Persuasion”, op.cit., p. 79; and Sauer, “Coercive Diplomacy Revisited”, 
op.cit., pp. 5-6.  
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enough in order to persuade the target that the costs of his compliance will be lower 
than the costs of his non-compliance.39 The target’s costs of compliance, in turn, 
depend on the magnitude of the coercer’s demand. Therefore, the coercive threat 
should not be too small in comparison to the coercer’s demand.40 On the other 
hand, one should also take into account that the credibility of a threat depends to a 
certain degree also “on the costs and risks associated with [its] fulfilment” for the 
coercer.41 Thus, too big threats might appear less credible for a target if their 
fulfilment implicates high costs and risks for the coercer. 
 
The Coercer’s Reputation 
Threats are more likely to be perceived as credible by the target if the coercer has 
already a reputation for “toughness” 42, that is, for executing his threats.43  
 
“Escalation Dominance”44 
The chance for success of coercive diplomacy is higher when the coercer manages 
it “to create fear of unacceptable escalation in the mind of the opponent”.45 
“Escalation dominance” then refers to a coercer who is able to quickly raise the 
costs of non-compliance for the target if the target continues to resist.46  
 
Time Limit 
Coercive diplomacy is more likely to succeed if the coercer’s threat is coupled with 
a reasonable deadline.47 The coercer should set the deadline according to what he 
demands of the target.48 The deadline therefore should not be, on the one hand, 
too tight, and, on the other hand, too loose as then the target might interpret this as 
a sign of the coercer’s weakness and might embark upon “delaying tactics”.49  
 
“Carrots and Sticks” 
Coercive diplomacy is more likely to succeed if the coercer combines his demand 
on the target also with positive inducements if he does comply.50 From a cost-benefit 
                                                 
39 Jakobsen, “Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War”, op.cit., p. 26. 
40 Sauer, “Coercive Diplomacy Revisited”, op.cit., p. 5. 
41 Schelling, op.cit., p. 6. 
42 S.J. Brams & M.P. Hessel, “Threat Power in Sequential Games”, International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1984, p. 27. 
43 Bratton, op.cit., p. 101. 
44 Hyde-Price, op.cit., p. 25.  
45 Jakobsen, “Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War”, op.cit., p. 27. 
46 Hyde-Price, op.cit., p. 26. 
47 Jakobsen, “Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War”, op.cit., p. 27. 
48 Ibid., p. 26.  
49 P.V. Jakobsen, “The Strategy of Coercive Diplomacy: Refining Existing Theory to Post-Cold 
War Realities”, in L. Freedman (ed.), Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1998, p. 72. 
50 Hyde-Price, op.cit., p. 22. 
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perspective, positive inducements do not actually reduce the target’s costs of 
compliance (as the demand itself is not changed) but make them more acceptable 
for the target, offering him additional benefits.51  
 
Do the Sticks Meet the Target’s “Most Vulnerable Pressure Points”?52 
The chance for success of coercive diplomacy is higher if the coercer’s threats are 
targeted at the opponent’s most important and valuable sectors and assets.53 In 
order to be able to determine these “pressure points”, the coercer has first to find out 
what accounts for the target’s strength and then to calculate which of these points 
of the target he can threaten credibly without being too costly for himself.54 
 
Domestic Political and Economic Realities within the Target State 
C o e r c i v e  d i p l o m a c y  i s  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  b e  s u c c e s s f u l  i f  t h e  c o e r c e r ’ s  d e m a n d  i s  
favourable to the interests of domestic key groups in the target state.55 In non-
democracies the success of coercive diplomacy is highly dependent on the interests 
of “key elite groups” and whether and how they are affected by the coercer’s 
demand.56 Jentleson differentiates between elite groups serving either as “circuit 
breakers” or as “transmission belts” for the coercer’s demand.57 They will likely serve 
as “circuit breakers” if compliance with the demand turns out to be disadvanta-
geous for their interests.58 They will likely serve as “transmission belts” if the 
concessions promote their interests.59  
 
Strength of the Coercer’s and the Target’s Motivation 
Attempts of coercive diplomacy constitute a form of “chicken game”.60 Giving in is 
tantamount to loosing.61 Therefore, as George argues, “the relative motivation of the 
two sides plays [an important role] in determining the outcome of coercive 
diplomacy”.62 The motivation depends highly on the strength and kind of interests 
which the coercer and the target associate with the conflict and on how much 
                                                 
51 D. Byman & M. Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits 
of Military Might, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 9-10. 
52 Hyde-Price, op.cit., p. 30.  
53 Bratton, op.cit., p. 106. 
54 Ibid. 
55 B. Jentleson, “Coercive Diplomacy: Scope and Limits in the Contemporary World”, The 
Stanley Foundation, Policy Analysis Brief, December 2006, p. 4, accessed 20 March 2008, 
www.stanleyfoundation.org/policyanalysis.cfm?id=57.  
56 Hyde-Price, op.cit., p. 30. 
57 Jentleson, “Coercive Diplomacy”, op.cit., p. 4. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 F. McGillivray & A.C. Stam, “Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of 
Economic Sanctions”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 2, 2004, p. 158. 
61 Art, “Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?”, op.cit., pp. 366-367. 
62 George, “Forceful Persuasion”, op.cit., p. 77. 
  9 EU Diplomacy Papers 1/2009 
each of them is willing to risk and pay for enforcing its interests. Jakobsen 
differentiates between four categories of interests, namely “vital”, “strategic”, 
“stability” and “moral/ideological” interests, and argues that the coercer’s willingness 
to use threats or even force in order to induce the target to comply is higher, if the 
conflict involves “vital” or “strategic” interests.63 
 
Unilateral or Coalitional Coercive Diplomacy 
It can be assumed that the coalitional use of coercive diplomacy generally 
diminishes its chances of success as it usually requires consensus amongst all coalition 
members, which can be an extremely difficult and protracted process.64 And even if 
there is consensus amongst the coalition members about the general objective of 
their coercion, they can still disagree about how it can be achieved best.65 
Furthermore, usually the members of the coercing coalition will  be required to make 
substantial concessions concerning the nature and the extent of the demand and 
the coercive threat in order to be able to reach a consensus and to maintain their 
coalition.66 This, in turn, is likely to diminish the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy.67 
Hyde-Price therefore concludes that employing “coercive diplomacy” successfully is 
“particularly difficult for alliances of democracies like NATO, or international 
organizations like the EU”.68  However, one could easily argue that coalitions using 
“coercive diplomacy” can exert a much bigger and more extensive pressure on a 
target state and usually have more resources at their disposal than a single coercing 
state.69  
 
Engaging in the Nuclear Standoff on Iran: the Objectives of the E-3/EU 
 
From a historical perspective, coherence of the EU member states on nuclear 
disarmament and non-proliferation has turned out to be difficult.70 In particular with 
regard to disarmament, there are cleavages among the EU member states: 
between France and the UK, which possess nuclear weapons, and those EU member 
states which have the technology and knowledge to produce nuclear weapons but 
have committed themselves under the NPT to refrain from doing so. The latter group 
consists of Germany and traditional “pro-disarmament” or non-aligned EU member 
                                                 
63 Jakobsen, “Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War”, op.cit., pp. 31-36. 
64 George, “Forceful Persuasion”, p. 70. 
65 Art, “Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?”, op.cit., p. 367. 
66 L. Freedman, “Introduction”, in L. Freedman (eds.), Strategic Coercion: Concepts and 
Cases, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 14. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Hyde-Price, op.cit., p. 33.  
69 George, “Forceful Persuasion”, op.cit., p. 70. 
70 S. Pullinger & G. Quille, “The European Union: Seeking Common Ground for Tackling 
Weapons of Mass Destruction”, Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 74, December 2003, accessed 
13 June 2008, www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd74/74europe.htm.  
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states like Ireland or Sweden which are members of the so-called “New Agenda 
Coalition” as well as Austria, Slovenia and Greece.71 
 
France and the UK turn to several arguments in order to justify their nuclear 
arsenals.72 Despite the clear provisions of Article VI NPT which oblige them to 
“eliminate” their nuclear weapons, they basically follow NATO’s position that nuclear 
weapons are “essential to preserve peace” and thus contribute to more security.73 
By contrast, the EU member states which belong to the New Agenda Coalition call 
for a “speedy, final and total elimination” of nuclear weapons by the NWS.74 
Submitting an annual resolution on disarmament at the UN General Assembly 
(UNGA), the NAC first succeeded in 1998 to drive a wedge between NATO members 
with nuclear weapons and those without.75 Also in 2004, the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs of Sweden, Greece and Finland openly declared that “[n]uclear disarmament 
is an integral part of the NPT regime”, calling for nuclear disarmament by the NWS, 
arguing that otherwise their “appeal to aspiring nuclear weapon states” like Iran 
would be “less credible”.76 
                                                
 
The E-3/EU’s Explicit Objectives in the Iranian Case  
Although the IAEA has so far been “unable to […] verify the absence of undeclared 
nuclear material and activities in Iran”,77 many EU member states suspect Iran of 
developing a nuclear weapons capability under the smoke-screen of the NPT.78 
Following its strategy against the proliferation of WMD, the E-3/EU’s obvious 
motivation for engaging in negotiations with Iran was based on the main principle 
already stated in the June 2003 declaration: “to prevent, deter, halt and, where 
possible, eliminate proliferation programmes of concern worldwide”.79 Iran 
constitutes a proliferation concern for the E-3/EU and should therefore be prevented 
from the acquisition of nuclear weapons.80 The Iranian leadership has always 
asserted that its nuclear activities are of an exclusively peaceful nature and not for 
 
71 Meier & Quille, op.cit. 
72 T. Sauer, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime in Crisis”, Peace Review: A Journal of Social 
Justice, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2006, p. 336. 
73 NATO’s Strategic Concept of 1991 quoted in T. Sauer, “Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear 
Disarmament: Two Sides of the Same Coin”, IIEB Working Paper, May 2005, p. 10, accessed 20 
May 2008, soc.kuleuven.be/iieb/bib.php?name=Sauer&init=T.    
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acquisition of nuclear weapons, an argument which was further supported by the 
Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei who issued a Fatwa “that the 
production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam and 
that Iran shall never acquire these weapons”.81 The E-3/EU’s focus therefore shifted to 
Iran’s potential nuclear weapons capability.82 The E-3/EU’s initial objective was to bar 
Iran from pursuing a closed nuclear fuel cycle including uranium enrichment, 
reprocessing, conversion, plutonium separation and the construction of heavy water 
reactors and to induce Iran to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol (AP).83  
 
The E-3/EU’s Implicit Objectives in the Iranian Case 
The E-3/EU’s implicit motivation for engaging in the crisis over the Iranian nuclear 
activities comes from its ambition to prove to the outside world its “actorness” 
qualities not only with regard to nuclear non-proliferation but also in general with 
regard to the CFSP.84 On the one hand, the Iranian case offered the opportunity for 
the E-3 to prove that the E-3/EU indeed is able to act and to intervene “commonly” 
in a crisis situation like the one over the Iranian nuclear crisis. On the other hand, by 
engaging in the crisis, the E-3/EU could prove its “leadership” qualities including its 
aspiration for “recognition” of its actorness by other countries like the US, its “ability to 
effectively negotiate with other actors”, the adoption and actual use of relevant 
“policy instruments” and the evidence of its “coherence”.85  
 
The Position of the Non-Aligned Movement on the Iranian Nuclear Programme  
The NAM encompasses 118 states which have committed themselves not to align 
“with or against any major power bloc”.86 The NAM states form a considerable voting 
bloc at the UNGA.87 Traditionally, the NAM member states have taken a strict stance 
on the disarmament obligation of the NWS under Article 6 of the NPT.88 They strictly 
oppose the NWS’ interpretation of Article 6 of the NPT and call it a “highly 
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discriminatory” reality.89 Despite defections by certain NAM member states, the 
majority of NAM members seems to support Iran’s nuclear fuel-cycle related 
activities, as becomes apparent from the statement adopted at the XVth Ministerial 
Conference of NAM in July 2008 which calls for the respect of “the basic and 
inalienable right of all states to develop research, production and use of atomic 
energy for peaceful purposes” and the respect of “[s]tates’ choices and decisions, 
including those of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the field of peaceful use of nuclear 
technology and its fuel cycle policies”.90   
 
Applying the Theory of Coercive Diplomacy to Iran 
 
This section investigates whether the E-3/EU coercive diplomacy approach vis-à-vis 
Iran has met the theoretical conditions successful for coercive diplomacy.  
 
Demand-related Variables: Nature of the Demand 
On 1 July 1968 Iran signed the NPT and subsequently ratified it in February 1970.91 It is 
thereby legally bound under Article II of the Treaty to abstain from the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons.92 H o w e ve r,  it h a s  a n  “ in a l ie n a b l e  r i g h t”  u n d e r  A r t ic l e  I V  N P T  to  
“develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes”.93 
Iran further concluded a Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) which entered into force in May 1974.94 Under this Agreement 
it is obliged to declare all its nuclear activities, including facilities and material to the 
IAEA.95 When the E-3 entered the negotiations with Iran on its undeclared nuclear 
facilities and activities in October 2003, they asked Iran to suspend all its “activities 
leading to the production of nuclear materials”, concretely uranium enrichment, 
conversion, plutonium reprocessing and the construction of heavy water facilities.96  
 
Against the background that Iran has kept its nuclear activities and facilities secret 
for over 18 years, its assumed connections to terrorist groups and to the A.Q. Khan 
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network and the fact that a civilian nuclear programme can be easily transformed 
into nuclear weapons capabilities (“dual-use”), the E-3/EU demand might indeed 
appear reasonable.97 Taking into account that North Korea has developed its 
nuclear weapons capability under the smoke screen of the NPT and then withdrew 
from it, an example which Iran might follow, the E-3/EU demand might even appear 
“plausible”.98 However, the IAEA and nobody would else have been able to verify 
that Iran wants to use its nuclear fuel cycle activities for other than “peaceful 
purposes”.99 Furthermore, other Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) like Japan or 
Brazil, which are also parties to the NPT, legally maintain a partial or full fuel cycle 
under the NPT.  
 
It is also questionable to which extent it makes sense with regard to the chance for 
success of coercive diplomacy to demand from a target country something that it 
has definitely refused to do from the beginning.100 Since the start of the nuclear 
negotiations, the Iranian leadership has declared that it will never permanently 
suspend its uranium enrichment activities.101 Applying George’s theoretical 
categories of coercive demands, the E-3/EU demand would best fit under “stop short 
o f  t h e  g o a l ” ,  t h e  m o s t  m o d e s t  d e m a n d  i n  c o e r c i v e  d i p l o m a c y . 102 However, the 
demand must be seen in relation to the target’s intentions.  
 
The Legitimacy of the Objective 
The E-3/EU objective of preventing Iran from the acquisition of a nuclear weapons 
capability, taking into account Iran’s alleged support of terrorist groups, might 
indeed appear legitimate.103 The question of the legitimacy of the E-3/EU demand 
w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  I r a n ,  h o w e v e r ,  i s  m u c h  m o r e  d i r e c t e d  a t  t h e  k e y  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  t h e  
“grand bargain” of the NPT.104  
 
When the NPT was set up in 1967, a division of the international community in the 
NWS and NNWS was introduced.105 According to Article 9 of the NPT, the NWS are 
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those states which had already acquired a nuclear weapons capability by 1967.106 
The NNWS committed themselves not to build or develop nuclear weapons under 
Article II NPT. In return for their relinquishment, they were granted an “inalienable 
right” under Article IV:1 NPT to “develop research, production and use of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes”. In addition, the NWS were obliged to step-by-step 
dismantle their nuclear weapons arsenals under Article VI of the NPT. This was the 
condition under which the NNWS agreed to abstain from the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons.107 Subsequent NPT Review Conferences had clearly stated that the 
obligation of nuclear disarmament implicated a de facto “elimination” of nuclear 
weapons by the NWS.108  
 
Whereas the NWS argue that nuclear proliferation and nuclear disarmament are two 
different issues, and therefore no comparison should be drawn between the 
compliance or non-compliance of the NWS with Article VI and that of the NNWS with 
Article II of the NPT, the NNWS (including Iran) perceive this practice as highly 
discriminatory.109 The Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs stated in 2005 that “the total 
indifference of nuclear weapon states to the wishes of the international community 
to make progress towards nuclear disarmament” could result in an “unravelling of 
the fabric, credibility and authority of the NPT”.110 The NNWS are closely monitored by 
the IAEA and are held accountable if they are suspected of being in non-
compliance with Article II NPT, whereas the NWS are not held accountable for their 
de facto non-compliance with the disarmament obligation under Article IV NPT.111 
The NNWS perceive this as injustice and complain that “they are the only ones who 
keep their part of the bargain”.112   
 
Assuming that Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle activities indeed serve the purpose of 
clandestinely building nuclear weapons, which could not be verified so far, it still 
remains doubtful whether the E-3/EU objective can be regarded as legitimate.113 
One should not forget which EU member states form the E-3, namely France, the UK 
and Germany. France and the UK (which is considered by the Iranian leadership as 
the “second Satan”114) are both in the possession of nuclear weapons and do not 
indicate any willingness to abandon them due to prestige and security benefits.115 It 
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is therefore doubtful whether France and the UK are able to “credibly convince Iran 
–  t h a t  i s  s i t u a t e d  i n  a  m u c h  v o l a t i l e  region, […] between two ‘de facto’ nuclear 
weapon states (Israel and Pakistan) that are apparently allowed to keep their 
nuclear weapons – not to acquire nuclear weapons”116 without being criticized for 
their unfair “double-standards” practice by the NAC or/and NAM states like Egypt or 
other Arabic or Islamic states.  
 
The Legitimacy of the Specific Demand 
At the beginning of the negotiations in October 2003, the E-3/EU specifically 
demanded of Iran to suspend all its nuclear fuel cycle activities which could enable 
it to acquire the necessary knowledge and capability to build nuclear weapons, 
including uranium enrichment, conversion and plutonium separation.117 When it 
became clear that Iran has proceeded with its activities and overcome certain 
technological difficulties, the focus of the E-3/EU demand has shifted to the 
suspension of uranium enrichment.118 Whereas the Iranian leadership claims that 
enriching uranium is its “inalienable right” as a party to the NPT and therefore a legal 
activity under Article IV of the NPT, the E-3 and E-3/EU argue that “Iran’s right to the 
peaceful use of [nuclear] power is distinct from ‘the right to enrich’, which does not 
exist”. 119  
 
Although the E-3/EU do not deny the NNWS the right under Article IV NPT to run fuel 
cycle activities, including the enrichment of uranium, for peaceful purposes, they 
argue that in the Iranian case these activities are not “normal” because Iran has not 
complied with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement.120 Iran has therefore, 
according to the E-3/EU, “forfeited its right” under Article IV NPT to pursue peaceful 
nuclear activities.121 According to the E-3/EU, Iran has also forfeited its right under 
Article IV:2 NPT to “undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate, in the 
fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological 
information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy”.122 Against the background of 
the “dual-use” nature of nuclear capabilities, the E-3/EU demand might be 
considered as comprehensible.  
 
However, it still remains doubtful whether the demand can be indeed also regarded 
as legitimate, especially against the background of the Indian-US deal on nuclear 
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cooperation which undermines the E-3/EU line of argumentation and the E-3/EU’s 
implicit tolerance of the nuclear activities carried out by Japan or Brazil.123 So far, the 
E-3/EU have not been able – and it is unlikely that they will be able – to convince the 
NAC, the NAM or other Arab or Islamic countries to follow their specific interpretation 
of Article IV NPT.124 Because of the de facto non-compliance of the NWS with their 
disarmament obligation, it is unlikely that the E-3/EU will be able to rally “broad 
political and normative support for confronting […] Iran’s nuclear weapons 
ambitions”.125 The credibility and legitimacy of the E-3/EU demand has been further 
undermined by the obvious attempts of the US to test new nuclear weapons and to 
exempt itself from global nuclear non-proliferation agreements like the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
 
Assurance against More Demands in the Future 
Indeed, one may conclude that Iran’s unwillingness to suspend uranium enrichment 
and thus to give in to the demand of the P5+2 can be partly attributed to its concern 
that an initial giving in might trigger an avalanche of new demands from both sides, 
the US and the E-3/EU. It is therefore unlikely that the P5+2 coercive diplomacy 
attempt will work out in the Iranian case. 
 
In 2004 the EU issued a report on the human rights situation in Iran which harshly 
criticised the Iranian leadership.126 Although the EU addressed the human rights 
abuses separately from the discussion about Iran’s nuclear activities, it is part of the 
EU’s common “double-tracked”127 approach to couple a particular area of concern 
with another critical aspect related to this country. 
 
Against the background of the implicit US calls for a regime change in Iran, 
upgraded by the US initiative of the Iran Democracy Act of 2003, it is comprehensible 
that the Iranian leadership fears new demands by the US or the E-3/EU when it would 
give in on the nuclear issue. The Iranian leadership regards giving in to the P5+2 
demand on the suspension of uranium enrichment as a “trap” which would spark off 
a spiral of new demands on human rights, democracy or its threatening gesture 
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towards Israel.128 Therefore, it is likely that Iran will try to resist the P5+2 demands as 
long as possible.129  
 
Credibility and Proportionality of the Threat 
Assessing the credibility and the potency of the E-3/EU and the US threats vis-à-vis 
Iran, it remains questionable whether any sanctions or threats of sanctions could 
induce Iran to abandon its nuclear fuel cycle activities. Despite the already 
comprehensive economic and financial sanctions within the framework of four UNSC 
resolutions, the separate financial EU sanctions and the unilateral US economic and 
financial sanctions against Iran, Iran has unaffectedly continued its nuclear fuel cycle 
activities.  
 
E-3/EU Threats 
In comparison to the E-3/EU demand vis-à-vis Iran, the sticks used by the E-3/EU have 
been small. The E-3/EU sticks included, on the one hand, the threat to support an 
IAEA resolution which would immediately refer the Iran case to the UNSC and, on the 
other hand, the threat to impose economic sanctions within the framework of a 
UNSC resolution under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.130  
 
Although in particular the French President Sarkozy and the French Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Kouchner have also indicated to consider the possibility of a military strike 
against Iran, the E-3/EU have always underlined that they focus on a diplomatic 
solution. The only possibility to further step up the pressure on Iran and its economy 
would be the imposition of sanctions on Iran’s oil and gas industry.131 However, an oil 
and gas embargo would likely not only be very painful for the Iranian economy but 
a l s o  f o r  m a n y  E U  m e m b e r  s t a t e s ,  a s  4 4 %  o f  I r a n ’ s  o i l  e x p o r t s  g o  t o  E U  m e m b e r  
states.132 Also sanctions targeting investment activities of foreign companies in the 
Iranian natural gas sector are highly unlikely due to the economic interests of 
companies in the EU member states.133 Possible vulnerable points of Iran’s oil and gas 
industry include Iran’s dependency on the import of oil refined products like 
gasoline.134  
 
Though an E-3/EU threat to impose sanctions on the Iranian oil sector would probably 
be the most potent one, it would also be the most costly and therefore the least 
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credible one to Iran.135 Furthermore, Russia and China as permanent members of the 
UNSC will likely oppose the imposition of such sanctions as particularly China’s 
economy is highly dependent on oil imports from Iran.136 Thus, the E-3/EU will likely be 
unable to impose such sanctions within the framework of the UNSC but would have 
to impose them separately, outside the UN framework, which would undermine its 
commitment to “effective multilateralism”. Although this scenario should not be 
completely ruled out, since the EU has in June 2008 already imposed financial 
sanctions on Iran outside the UNSC by freezing the assets of Iran’s Melli Bank, it is 
unlikely.  
 
US/Israeli Threats 
Both the US government and Israel’s leadership have openly threatened Iran with a 
possible military strike if Iran does not suspend its nuclear fuel cycle activities. US 
President Bush has always made clear that with regard to the Iranian nuclear 
programme “all options are on the table”, implicitly referring also to the one of a pre-
emptive military strike. Israel has also threatened Iran with a pre-emptive military 
strike.137 Israel perceives a nuclear-armed Iran as an “existential threat” after the 
Iranian President Ahmadinejad has officially called for Israel to be “wiped off the 
map”.138 In 1981, Israel has already once launched a pre-emptive military strike at 
the nuclear reactor Osirak in Iraq, referring to its right of self-defence.139 Beside the 
fact that the “threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner”140 violates UN law according to 
Article 2:4 of the UN Charter, such strikes will be likely regarded as excessive, illegal if 
without UN authorization and questionable with regard to their destroying or 
delaying effect on the Iranian nuclear facilities.141 It would be difficult to hit the 
suspected facilities as they are widely dispersed, some of them located underground 
and others even unknown.142   
 
In addition, the repercussions of such a military action against Iran would be fatal. 
With a strike against Iran the US would further antagonize and destabilize the Middle 
East and other Islamic and Arab countries. A military strike by the US and/or Israel 
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would probably even increase Iran’s resolve of acquiring a nuclear weapons 
capability and fuel anti-US resentments in Iran.143 Iran could use a military strike by 
the US or Israel as a plausible justification for the need of an own nuclear weapons 
programme.144 Finally, Iran has different possibilities at its disposal to strike back, inter 
alia to assail UK and US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan or to block the strait of Hormuz 
where daily 21 million barrels of oil pass on their way to Europe.145  
 
The Coercer’s Reputation 
The EU is generally rather reluctant to carry out its threats and impose economic or 
political sanctions. According to Einhorn, the EU is considered by other states as a 
natural “good cop”.146 In contrast to the US – the “bad cop” with its inclination to 
pre-emptive strikes and its military superiority –, the EU is often perceived as a “soft 
power” with limited military capability, focusing rather on diplomatic solutions and a 
policy of engagement.147 The E-3/EU threats of economic and political sanctions vis-
à-vis Iran might therefore be perceived as little credible by Iran.148  
 
Escalation Dominance 
So far, the P5+2 have not been able to evoke any fear of escalation by the Iranian 
leadership. On the one hand, the P5+2 have not been able to credibly threaten Iran 
with an immediate imposition of higher costs. On the contrary, due to Russia’s and 
China’s opposition to tougher sanctions, the process of negotiations and of the final 
adoption of UNSC resolutions against Iran has been protracted. On the other hand, 
Iran has used effective counter-threats to encounter the P5+2 threats, including the 
threat of its withdrawal from the NPT, the threat of “double force”149 retaliation and 
the threat of suspending the application of the AP. Although these threats might in 
hindsight rather be considered a “bluff” by Iran, as they would undermine the 
credibility of the peaceful purpose of its nuclear activities, they further strengthened 
Iran’s negotiation position vis-à-vis the P5+2.150  
 
Time Limit 
The P5+2 have set Iran many deadlines for complying.151 However, the P5+2 and E-
3/EU deadlines were not perceived as credible by Iran. In many cases, the deadlines 
expired without any immediate, painful consequences for Iran due to the protracted 
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decision-making process of the P5+2 coalition. In other cases, the E-3/EU have put off 
the deadline for Iran’s compliance, trying to give it more time as was the case with 
the IAEA Board resolution of February 2006. In certain cases, Iran simply ignored the 
deadline set by the P5+2 for responding to its package deal and instead determined 
the deadline when it would respond by itself, for example its response to the initial 
package deal of the P5+2. Iran has thereby successfully exploited the coalitional 
difficulties in order to buy time either to fulfil the demands or to postpone further 
sanctions.152 
 
“Carrots and Sticks” 
The E-3/EU has offered various kinds of benefits in return for Iran’s suspension of its fuel 
cycle activities. In the area of nuclear cooperation, the E-3/EU benefits have 
focused, inter alia, on the provision of a guaranteed access to nuclear fuel and the 
acknowledgement of Iran’s right under Article IV NPT to pursue fuel cycle activities 
for peaceful purposes.153 With regard to economic cooperation, the E-3/EU have 
offered to actively support Iran’s aspirations of becoming a member of the World 
Trade Organization by pushing for the opening of its accession negotiations and the 
resumption of negotiations on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement.154 In the 
political and security field, the E-3/EU have offered Iran to cooperate on combating 
terrorism and drug trafficking, on the creation of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East 
and to provide Iran, within a framework of a long-term agreement, with “firm 
commitments on security issues”.155  
 
Although the E-3/EU “carrots” are quite comprehensive, they do not offer what Iran 
wants mostly, namely security assurances from the US.156 Thus, the E-3/EU benefits to 
Iran are insufficient in order to induce Iran to suspend its fuel cycle activities.157 
Although it is doubtful whether any E-3/EU “carrots”, no matter how juicy they might 
be, could induce Iran to suspend its nuclear activities, it is clear that the E-3/EU will 
not be able to offer “juicier carrots” as they “may just not have such carrots in [their] 
garden”.158 
 
The Role of Elites  
The role of the Iranian elites might be relevant with regard to inducing the country’s 
leadership to suspend its fuel cycle activities. Although Iran’s key elite groups 
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generally back the idea of their country having a “nuclear option”,159 they are 
divided with regard to their willingness to bear the costs of further sanctions in case 
Iran goes ahead with its nuclear fuel cycle activities.160  
 
Whereas the hardliners around Khamanei regard Iran’s nuclear programme as their 
“baby”,161 pragmatists are concerned about the economic costs they might have to 
bear in case of further sanctions by the P5+2.162 It can be assumed that the hardliners 
will be willing to bear any costs in order to pursue the “nuclear option”, which they 
not only regard as the best deterrent against potential aggressors, but also as a 
good way to win domestic support by “nationalizing” the project.163  
 
The pragmatists, mainly key businessmen, in contrast, focus mainly on the economic 
consequences of such a confrontational approach towards the West.164 Although 
they regard the nuclear option as a significant “bargaining card” that Iran might use 
for normalizing its relations with the US, they are unlikely to accept significant 
economic costs such as the loss of foreign investments as a consequence of further 
P5+2 sanctions.165 So far, Ahmadinejad has been quite successful in instigating the 
Iranian public against the pressure put on the regime by the UNSC sanctions, literally 
forming a “pro-nuclear nationalism”.166 This could change, if the sanctions of the 
P5+2 were painful for Iran’s economy and threatened the Iranian leadership’s 
“control of power” by provoking public dissatisfaction.167  
 
Motivation 
Although one can only speculate about Iran’s real intentions behind its nuclear fuel 
cycle activities, one might assume for several reasons that Iran at least strives for a 
nuclear weapons option and is therefore “highly motivated” not to give in to the 
P5+2 demands.168 The argument of the Iranian leadership that it pursues fuel cycle 
activities only for the purpose of generating nuclear electricity, in order to be self-
sufficient from foreign fuel suppliers and in order to increase its economic 
competitiveness, appears questionable.169 
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Firstly, Iran’s argument that its reserves of gas and oil are not infinite is contradictory 
to earlier statements that Iran’s energy reserves were “endless”.170 Secondly, even 
though some experts argue that without foreign investments in the oil production 
technology, Iran might need to import oil by 2010,171 others argue that even if Iran’s 
fuel cycle activities were for the purpose of generating nuclear energy and 
achieving independence from foreign fuel suppliers, Iran would still need to import 
uranium in order to produce enriched fuel for the international market.172 Against this 
background, it appears at least implausible that the Iranian leadership would bear 
the costs caused by the economic UNSC sanctions imposed just for the purpose of 
securing its energy provision and ensuring its fuel independence. 
 
In terms of security, it can be stated that Iran is located in a war-torn and volatile 
region and is encircled by a “tough nuclear neighbourhood”,173 in particular Israel 
and Pakistan which both possess nuclear weapons and maintain close relationships 
with the US.174 The US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan are perceived by Iran as a 
significant source of threat.175 These factors might induce Iran to think that it needs a 
nuclear weapons capability as an effective deterrent against potential aggressors.176 
Should Iran indeed strive for a nuclear weapons capability because of its security 
concerns, this would imply that the E-3/EU’s coercive diplomacy touches on Iran’s 
vital interests and will therefore very likely fail. The acquisition of a nuclear weapons 
capability is also closely intertwined with Iran’s pride and its aspirations to become a 
regional power in the Middle East.177 Presenting the P5+2 pressure against Iran’s 
nuclear programme as “selective non-proliferation” and “nuclear apartheid”,178 the 
Iranian leadership has succeeded in activating the public’s resentments against the 
West and “[a]tomic energy has become the glue that has reinforced the solidarity of 
the nation”.179 In addition, the nuclear option is regarded by the Iranian leadership 
and public as a symbol for Iran’s status.180 T h is  w o u l d  m e a n  th a t  n o  p o s it i v e  a n d  
negative inducements could bring Iran to suspend its nuclear fuel cycle activities as 
its motivation touches on pride, prestige and regional supremacy, all factors which 
cannot be influenced by “sticks or carrots” since they are of a psychological nature. 
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Coalitional Coercive Diplomacy 
Two coalitions of coercers can be discerned, namely the E-3/EU coalitional format 
and the P5+2 coalitional format. In assessing the E-3/EU’s performance in engaging in 
negotiations with Iran on the nuclear issue, it becomes clear that although it has 
turned out to be quite successful at the beginning, succeeding in concluding the 
Tehran and the Paris Agreement and in inducing Iran to sign the Additional Protocol 
and to voluntary apply it pending ratification, this coalitional format had to grapple 
with certain problems. Firstly, it includes the two EU NWS, France and the UK, whose 
positions on the Iranian nuclear issue were certainly not representative for all EU 
member states. This might have from the beginning undermined the legitimacy and 
objectiveness of the E-3/EU’s demand. Secondly, although the E-3/EU seemed to 
agree on the general objective, they were divided on how to achieve this objective 
with France and the UK, which insisted on “zero enrichment”, and Germany as a 
NNWS, which was willing to settle for a “delayed limited enrichment”.181  
 
With regard to the P5+2 coalitional format and its impact on the chance for success 
of coercive diplomacy vis-à-vis Iran, it can be stated that on the one hand, it has 
provided the E-3/EU initiative with more bite, more legitimacy and with more 
resources concerning the possibility of offering Iran the “juicy carrots” it wants. 
However, on the other hand, the P5+2 coalition has significantly constrained the E-
3/EU room for manoeuvre with the US on the one side, pushing for a tougher stance 
but undermining the E-3/EU efforts by concluding a deal with India on civilian nuclear 
cooperation, and with Russia and China on the other side, opposing the imposition 
of further sanctions.182 The protracted bargaining within the P5+2 and the diluted 
UNSC sanctions in fact provided Iran with more time not only for compliance but also 
for searching new loopholes.183 In addition, the P5+2 coalitional format created the 
outward impression of being “fragile”, not only to Iran.184 
 
Conclusion: the E-3/EU’s Performance – Failure or Success? 
 
Applying the analytical framework as outlined above, the E-3/EU’s performance can 
be partially seen as a success in terms of the E-3/EU’s “actorness” qualities and 
partially as a failure in terms of the outcome of their engagement. 
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With regard to the outcome, the E-3/EU have not been able to dissuade Iran from 
carrying out its full fuel cycle activities.185 However, assessing the outcome-related 
performance it should not be disregarded that the E-3/EU, within the framework of 
the Tehran declaration and the Paris Agreement, initially succeeded in inducing Iran 
to first sign the AP, second to apply the AP pending ratification, third to temporarily 
suspend all fuel cycle activities and fourth to provide the required additional 
information to the IAEA.186 In addition, it can be assumed that the temporary 
suspension at least might have had some delaying effects on Iran’s full fuel cycle 
activities.187 
 
With regard to the E-3/EU’s “actorness” qualities, the engagement was quite 
successful in terms of the E-3/EU’s capacity and resolve to act and in terms of unity. 
The E-3/EU have engaged and reacted straightforward in order to prevent an 
escalation of the situation and succeeded in bringing the US, China and Russia on 
board.188 They further succeeded in engaging the US in direct talks with Iran – 
something that the US has always refused to do and they have consolidated the 
P5+2 coalition to the extent that the UNSC was able to adopt already four resolutions 
against Iran.189 Thus, the E-3/EU “proved itself as a coalition builder while maintaining 
credibility as a mediator between the Iran and the coalition”.190  
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